Lydia G. Ivie v. Dennis Waring Richardson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1958
Lydia G. Ivie v. Dennis Waring Richardson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Marvin J. Bertoch; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ivie v. Richardson, No. 8856 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3084
LJE~ l 91958 
IN THE SUPREM~ COURT 
of the · D 
STATE OF uxi:f.l l ~ 
r\' 2 1 19~8 
LYDIA G. IVIE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vs. 
DENNIS WARING RICHARDSO·N, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
8856 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
· Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT I --------------------------------------------_________ ------------------------------- 4 
POINT II -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 
POINT I ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
A. Plaintiff was negligent per se because she violated a 
Utah statute applicable to pedestrians and her viola-
tion was a proximate cause of her injury __________________________ 4 
B. Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout _____________________ 13 
C. Plaintiff used a dangerous route when a safer route 
was available to her and equally convenient ---------------------- 14 
POINT II -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
CON CL USI 0 N -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
CASES CITED 
Akers v. Cowan, 8 0 P. ( 2) 14 3 (Cal.) ---------------------------------------- 19 
Anderson v. Mammoth Mining Co. 93 P. 190 (Utah) ____________________ 14 
Brunette v. Bierke, 72 N .W. ( 2) 702 (Wis.) ------------------------------- 7 
Ferguson v. Nakahara 11 0 P. 2 d 1 0 91 (Cal.) ---------------------------------- 18 
Mazzotta v. Los Angeles County and Sam Finkelstein, 
15 3 P. ( 2 ) 3 41 (Cal.) ----------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Mingus v. Olsen, 2 0 1 P. ( 2) 4 9 5 (Utah) ---------------------------------------- 9 
Randolph v ~ Campbell, 6 2 A ( 2) 6 0 ( Pa.) ---------------------------------------- 19 
San t v. Miller, 2 0 6 P. ( 2 ) 719 9 (Utah) ------------------------------------------ 12 
Sears v. Birbeck, 3 21 Pa. 3 7 5, 3 8 3, 18 4 A. 6, 1 0 ----------------------------- 19 
Smith v. Bennett, 265 P. (2) 401 (Utah) -------------------------------------- 12 
Soda v. Marriott, 5 P. ( 2) 67 5 (Cal.) ------------------------------------------- 19 
Spear v. Leuenberger, 112 P. ( 2) 4 3 (Cal.) ------------------------------------ 17 
Williams v. Portland General Electric Co. 
24 7 P. ( 2) 494 (Oregon) --------------------------------------------------------- 19 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3 - 41-6-7 9 ------------------------------------------ 5 
Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3 - 41-6- 8 2 ----------------------------------------- 5 
Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3 - 41-6-8 (d) -------------------------------------- 5 
Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3 - 41-6-8 (c) ------------------------------------ 5 
Utah Code Annotated 19 5 3 - 41-6-8 2 (a) ----------------------------------5, 6 
Utah Code Annotated 19 53 - 41-6-7 9 (a) ------------------------------------ 6 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 - 41-6-7 (a) (b) (c) (d) ------------ 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYDIA G. IVIE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vs. 
DENNIS WARING RICHARDSO·N, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8856 
This case is before this court on appeal from the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 11 3 0 5 5. The 
cause was tried, submitted to a jury and a verdict returned 
for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000.00. Defendant's 
motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in ac-
cordance with defendant's motion for directed verdict 
was denied. 
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On June 9, 1956, plaintiff, a woman, purchased 
groceries at a store located on the northwest corner of Jrd 
South and 3rd East in Salt Lake City and then proceeded 
to walk north on the sidewalk on the west side of 3rd East 
Street with a child, her niece. She continued to walk 
north until she reached a driveway area leading from the 
main traveled portion of 3rd East Street westward over 
the sidewalk and into a public garage. (R. 1) and (Ex. 1) 
She stopped in front of the garage and observed the double 
doors to the garage were open. She lived just across the 
street (R.2) and knew cars frequently used this driving 
area going into and out of the garage. She looked at the 
open doorway and saw no cars at the threshhold of the 
doorway, but did not look westward through the doorway 
into the garage to see if any cars were approaching from 
inside the garage. (R. 12, 13) She then turned eastward, 
left the sidewalk and proceeded several steps forward on 
the driveway with her back to the garage, (R. 3, R. 8) 
intending to jaywalk across 3rd East Street on her way 
to her home. ( R. 9, 10) As far as she recalls she did not 
at any time look backward to see if an automobile was 
approaching prior to the time she was bumped from the 
rear by defendant's automobile (R. 14) which defendant 
was slowly backing out of the garage. (R. 19). 
Plaintiff testified there were available to her several 
routes which she could have taken with equal convenience. 
(R. 16, 17) Had she taken one of them she would not 
have been injured. If she had walked on the curbed area 
instead of the driveway area just a foot or two south of 
the path she took, she would not have been hit. (R. 17) 
She could have proceeded from the grocery store directly 
east on a pedestrian crosswalk across 3 rd East to the east-
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side of the street and then north on the sidewalk to her 
home and the route would have been no farther than the 
one she attempted to take and this accident would not 
have occurred. (R. 14) 
The defendant, a young man, was outside the United 
States at the time of the trial and a brief statement as to 
what his testimony would be were he to testify was stipu-
lated to at pretrial and read into the record and was as 
follows: 
((That he was backing out of his uncle's garage 
at a speed less than 1 or 2 miles per hour and was 
crossing the sidewalk. He checked to see if any 
people were coming from either direction and then 
proceeded to back out. Previous, he looked out 
the rear window and saw no one. Just as he crossed 
the sidewalk he heard a child start to cry and imme-
diately stopped the car. When he got out he saw 
a woman sitting down next to the car. The lady 
was in the blind spot between the back window 
and side window and he did not see her." ( R. 53, 
R. 54) 
Plaintiff was struck by the left rear bum per of the 
car, knocking her down with her knee twisted under her. 
She got up and proceeded to walk across the street to her 
home. (R. 4) She had undergone an operation on her 
knee in 1950 and had the kneecap removed (R. 5, R. 30) 
and she was suffering some trouble with her knee from the 
time of that operation up to the time of this accident. 
(R. 7) The plaintiff's doctor diagnosed her injuries re-
sulting from this accident as contusion of the sacrum, 
sprain of the left knee and contusion of the left calf. (R. 
30) The doctor believes that uan attempt should be made 
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by an operative procedure to improve the function of 
her knee." ( R. 3 2) She lost three days work as a result 
of the accident. (R. 29, R. 30) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Plaintiff was negligent per se because she violated 
a Utah statute applicable to pedestrians and her violation 
was a proximate cause of her injuries. 
B. Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout. 
C. Plaintiff used a dangerous route when a safer 
route was available to her and equally convenient. 
POINT II 
TWO OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE ERRONE-
OUS AND PREJUDICIAL AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE 
ONE OF THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS WAS 
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Plaintiff was negligent per se because she violated 
a Utab statute applicable to pedestria11,s and her violation 
was a proxintate cause of her injury. 
Plaintiff's conduct constituted negligence per se be-
cause in walking on the driveway at the place and in the 
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manner in which she was so walking she was violating Sec-
tions 41-6-79 and 41-6-82, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
((41-6-79. Pedestrian Shall Yield Right of Way 
(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the 
d " roa way. 
((41-6-82. Walking Along or Upon Roadways 
-Standing in Roadway for Prohibited Purposes: 
(a) Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be un-
lawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon 
an adjacent roadway." 
The Court's instruction to the jury revealed that the 
Court gave no credence to defendant's contention that 
the driveway involved was not a private driveway, but 
a part of the public street, a part of the roadway concern-
ing which the traffic rules and regulations of the 
Motor Vehicle Act of the State of Utah were applicable; 
that the plaintiff was not about to ((jaywalk," but that 
she was already jaywalking at the time of the accident. 
The public street or highway includes sidewalks on 
each side of the roadway and all the area between the 
sidewalks. (Sec. 41-6-8 (d). U. C. A. 1953). The side-
walk is the part of the public street set aside for pedestrian 
travel and all areas between the sidewalk which are ((des-
ignated or ordinarily used for vehicular travel" (Section 
41-6-8 (c). U. C. A. 1953) are a part of the public ((road-
way." Therefore, the place at which the plaintiff was 
struck was part of the public roadway, and while there, 
plaintiff was ( 1) committing a misdemeanor (Section 41-
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6-82 (a)); (2) was obligated to yield the right of way to a 
vehicle traveling thereon (Section 41-6-79 (a)). 
The following statutory definitions support the posi-
tion of the defendant: 
rr41-6-7 (a) Street or Highway. The en-
tire width between the boundary lines of every way 
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open 
to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular 
travel. 
c:c (b) Private Road or Driveway. Every way 
or place in Private ownership (emphasis supplied) 
and used for vehicular travel by the owner and 
those having express or implied permission from the 
owner, but not by other persons. 
(( (c) Roadway. That portion of highway 
improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. 
u (d) Sidewalk. That portion of a street 
(emphasis supplied) betw~een the curb lines, or the 
lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent 
property lines intended for the use of pedestrians." 
From the foregoing definitions, I think it is patent 
that the plaintiff at the time she was struck was (I) on 
part of the public roadway; (2) she was at that location 
illegally; and ( 3) in that location she was obligated to 
yiel~ +~e right of way to vehicular traffic. 
I au not think the clear language of the statutes re-
quires judicial interpretation to achieve the above con-
clusion. There are no Utah cases exactly in point cover-
it1g a perfectly analogous fact situation. The only case 
in the books I have been able to :find, the facts of which 
render it directly in point on this proposition, is a recent 
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Wisconsin case, Brunette v. Bierke, 72 N. W. (2) 702, 
decided in November, 1955. 
That case involves a fact situation which I think is al-
most identical with the situation in the case at bar, and as 
to the motor vehicle statutes involved, one is the same in 
substance as the Utah statute and the other is identical to 
the Utah statute. 
The Wisconsin case is an action for injuries sustained 
by a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile backing 
out of a service station. The trial judge rendered judg-
ment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that for right of way purposes, 
a concrete ((apron" extending from sidewalk line to curb 
line and constructed to provide convenient approach for 
motorists to the service station constituted a part of the 
highway, and the pedestrian owed the duty to yield to the 
vehicle right of way over such apron. I have underlined 
certain words above to emphasize the similarity between 
the facts in that case and the facts in the case at bar. 
On pages 704 and 705 of the opinion, the court stated 
as follows: 
uon the other hand, sec. 8 5.1 0 ( 21 ) provides 
that (a highway is every way or place of whatever 
nature open to the use of the public as a matter of 
right for the purposes of vehicular travel', and sec. 
85.44 ( 4) provides that (every pedestrian crossing a 
highway at any other point than a marked or un-
marked crosswalk shall yield the right of way to 
vehicles upon the highway.' The apron was (open 
to the use of the public as a matter of right for the 
purposes of vehicular travel'; its very purpose was 
to provide a convenient approach by motorists to 
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the service station. It was open to use by the Pl1b-
lic cas a matter of right' because the right of the 
public to use a street for p,urposes of travel extends 
to the entire width of the street, to its whole sur-
face, 25 Am. Jur. 461; Chase v. City of Oshkosh, 
81 Wis. 313,51 N. W. 560, 15 L. R. A. 553. Peters 
was not on a crosswalk when he was struck. Thus 
by the provisions of sees. 85.10 {21) and 85.44(4) 
the motorist, not the pedestrian, appears to be giv-
en the right of way. 
u ( 2) The word (sidewalk' is ordinarily used 
to designate a portion of a highway which has been 
set apart for pedestrians as distinguished from that 
which is used by vehicles, 2 Bouv. Law Diet., 
Rawle's Third Revision, p. 3068. Manifestly the 
apron was not intended for use by pedestrians; an 
adequate 5-foot strip of concrete was provided for 
them. The apron was constructed to provide a 
convenient approach for motorists to the service 
station, to replace or as a substitute for an elevated 
curb and boulevard which would constitute an ob-
stacle to entry to the station. It was the obvious 
intent of the legislature to grant to the pedestrian 
the right of way at places at which they are usual-
ly found, upon sidewalks as that term is univer-
sally understood. We do not consider that it was 
in tended by the legis! a ture to extend the area in 
which the rights of pedestrians over the motorist 
are recognized. We can perceive no reason for so 
doing. On the contrary, it would be absurd to 
contend that the apron was constructed for any 
purpose other than to accommodate the motorist. It 
was con~tructed primarily, if not exclusively, for 
his easy passage to the station. We must assume that 
the legislature had these well-known facts in mind 
when enacting the statutes and that they did not 
intend that a pedestrian should be given more fa-
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vorable consideration than is to be given a motorist 
when the pedestrian is found in a place where he 
should not be, or where foot-travelers are not ordi-
narily found. We think therefor that for the pur-
pose of determining who has the right of way, sec. 
8 5.44 ( 5) must be construed as, granting to the 
pedestrian the right of way over the motorist only 
when he is upon that portion of the sidewalk which 
is set apart for him, in this case the 5 -foot strip im-
mediately adjacent to the service station property, 
that the apron is to be considered as a part of the 
highway as defined in sec. 85.10 (21), and that since 
the jury might properly have found that Peters was 
upon it when he was struck, it was his duty to yield 
the right of way and that it was proper for the 
trial court to instruct the jury as it did." 
If a Utah Court interprets the motor vehicle statu-
tory provisions involved as they were interpreted by the 
Wisconsin Court (and I think such interpretation is com-
pelled by the clear wording of the statutes), then I do not 
see how a Utah Court could avoid reaching the same re-
sult in the case at bar as was reached by the Wisconsin 
Court in the case before it. 
If we take the point of view of the Wisconsin Court 
and conclude that the motor vehicle law of Utah is appli-
cable, in other words, that the plaintiff was at the time of 
the accident located on part of the public roadway, then 
certain declarations of the Utah Supreme Court become 
strikingly pertinent. 
Mingus v. Olsen, 201 P. (2) 495 (Utah, 1949) is a 
case in point. 
In that case a man and his wife started to cross: Thir-
teenth East in Salt Lake City near its intersection with 
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Westminster Avenue. They were proceeding in an un-
marked crosswalk that extended over Thirteenth East. 
The defendant's automobile struck the man and he was 
killed. The court granted defendant's motion for directed 
verdict uon the grounds that the evidence showed that, as 
a matter of law, plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contri-
butory negligence.'' 
The court said: 
ccAs to whether or not decedent was within 
the crosswalk at the time of the collision, there is 
a conflict in the evidence. For purposes of this ap-
peal, we must assume that deceased was in the cross-
walk at the time he was struck. The crucial ques-
tion is whether decedent failed to keep a proper 
lookout for approaching traffic." 
(That is certainly one of the crucial questions involved in 
the case at bar) . 
On the subject of lookout, the Court said on page 498: 
. uMore convincin.g than the direct testimony 
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence 
that deceased neither said nor did anything to indi-
cate that he was at all aware of the danger presented 
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems 
to have been wholly una"rare of its approach. Cer-
tainly he did nothing either to warn his wife, nor 
to rescue either himself or her from their position 
of peril. On this evidence, it must be said as a mat-
ter of law that deceased either failed to look, or 
having looked, failed to see what he should have 
seen. 
u ( 4, 5) There can be no doubt that a pedes-
trian who undertakes to cross a busy street of a 
large city, without first observing for vehicular 
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traffic is guilty of contributory negligence. And 
this is true, even though he may be crossing in a 
crosswalk, and have the right of way. In the re-
cent case of Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 19 0 P. 2d 
514, this court held that a motorist who had the 
right of way across an intersection, nevertheless had 
a duty to observe for traffic as he proceeded across 
the intersection. The rights of pedestrians to the 
use of the public streets are the same as those of 
motorists - neither greater nor less. Hence, the 
same general duties devolve upon them. A pedes-
strian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pe-
trian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pe-
way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty 
to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neg-
lected that duty in this case. It follows that he 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of 
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance 
in the direction of the approaching automobile 
would suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it 
the duty to see what is there to be seen, and to pay 
heed to it." (Emphasis supplied) 
If it is true, as Justice Wolfe said in the Mingus case, 
that the ((rights of pedestrians to the use of the public 
streets are the same as those of motorists-neither greater 
nor less," then the plaintiff in the case at bar was certainly 
contributorily negligent. If it was negligence for the de-
fendant Richardson to fail to keep a proper lookout for 
the plaintiff (and the jury obviously decided it was), then 
it was negligence on the part of the plaintiff to fail to keep 
a proper lookout for the defendant's automobile. If we 
assume the defendant was negligent, even though his testi-
mony was that he did examine the area behind him through 
the rear vision mirror, then certainly the plaintiff was 
negligent when, according to her testimony, she does not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
recall maintaining any lookout whatsoever to her rear for 
an approaching vehicle as she proceeded down the drive-
way. 
I submit that even if the driveway involved were a 
private driveway, under the fact circumstances appearing 
from the plaintiff's own testimony in this case, the plain-
tiff was at least as negligent as the defendant, and therefore 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. When a 
pedestrian is walking in an area which she knows is pri-
marily designed and used for vehicular traffic, she cer-
tainly owes some duty to maintain a reasonable lookout, 
and there can be no question but that her failure to main-
tain a lookout was a proximate cause of her injuries in 
this case. 
Smith v. Bennett, 265 P. (2) 401 (Utah, 1953) also 
is a case in point. There also a pedestrian was struck while 
crossing a public roadway. In this case, unlike the Mingus 
case, and I submit similar to the case at bar, the plaintiff 
was not in a marked or unmarked crosswalk. This is an-
other case in which the defendant was awarded a directed 
verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. A particularly significant 
statement of the court was this: 
uBy attempting to cross the street in disre-
gard of safety rules, she (plaintiff) was charged 
with a bigh standard of care, (emphasis supplied) 
the duty being commensurate with the perilous 
. '' circumstances. 
In the case of San! v. Miller, 206 Pac. 2d 719 (Utah 
1949) the court was concerned with a pedestrian who had 
been injured while crossing a street at a place contrary to 
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law. While doing so he failed to keep a proper lookout and 
the court said: 
((Having omitted to continue to watch, he 
failed to exercise the degree of care required of a 
pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and places 
himself in a position of peril. A greater degree of 
care is necessary upon the part of a pedestrian who 
undertakes to cross a city street at a prohibited 
place than is placed on one who uses a marked 
crosswalk." 
I submit that in the case before the court the plaintiff 
left a place of safety, to-wit, a sidewalk and placed herself 
in a position of peril, to-wit, in an area which was designed 
for the use of vehicular traffic. She omitted to continue 
to watch and, therefore, failed to exercise the degree of 
care required of such a pedestrian. Furthermore, she 
undertook to cross a city street at a prohibited place and 
uA greater degree of care is necessary upon the part of a 
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city street at a pro-
hibited place than is placed on one who uses a marked 
crosswalk." 
Later the court said: 
((Because of the violation of the quoted ordi-
nance and statute, appellant was on the street at a 
prohibited place, and under these circumstances, 
he was required to constantly observe the move-
ment of traffic from the direction it should legally 
travel." 
B. Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout. 
Even if we do not rely on the statute discussed under 
A, we can rely wholly on common law negligence. It is 
the defendant's contention that the plaintiff in walking 
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along an area designed for vehicular traffic without ever 
glancing back to see if an automobile was approaching was 
negligent in that she failed to keep a proper lookout, indeed 
any lookout whatsoever, for cars which she should.reason-
ably have anticipated might have been approaching from 
the rear. 
Even if the plaintiff had been walking on a private 
driveway~ which was not part of a public road, she should 
have, in the exercise of ordinary care, maintained a ~ore 
vigilant lookout than she did in this instance. She would 
be expected to foresee the possibility of approaching auto· 
mobiles even on a private driveway, which driveway 
primarily existed for the purpose of accommodating vehi-
cular traffic. 
C. Plaintiff used a dangerous route when a safer route 
was available to her and equally convenient. 
Plaintiff's testimony clearly reveals that to be a fact. 
The negligence of such conduct is recognized in Anderson 
vs. Mammoth Mining Co. 93 P. 190 (Utah 1907). 
POINT II 
TWO OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL AND 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE ONE OF TIIE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUES~D INSTRUCTIONS WAS 
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL. 
The Court~s Instruction No. 4 was as follows: 
ulf you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant failed to keep and main-
tain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the drive-
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way where the accident occurred and that such 
failure proximately resulted in the accident, then 
your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant." 
This instruction is obviously erroneous due to the 
fact that it is a formula instruction directing ~he jury to 
find a verdict for the plaintiff if the circumstances exist as 
set forth in the instruction yet in the instruction there is 
no provision made for the affect of contributory negli-
gence. In other words, if the jury finds that the defend-
ant was negligent then the jury is bound by that 
instruction to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
is not required, or indeed permitted, to give any considera-
tion to contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 
The same type of error is committed in Instruction 
No. 10, which reads as follows: 
((You are instructed that the law in force in 
the State of Utah on the 9th day of June, 1956, 
which relates to the operators of motor vehicles was 
as follows: 
((1. That the driver of a vehicle within a busi-
ness or residential district emerging from any al-
ley, driveway or building shall stop such vehicle 
immediately prior to driving on to a sidewalk or 
into the sidewalk area extending across any alley-
way or private driveway and shall yield the right of 
way to any pedestrian, as may be necessary, to avoid 
collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield 
the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said 
roadway. 
u2. The driver of a vehicle shall not back the 
same unless such movement can be made with rea-
sonable safety and without interfering with other 
traffic. 
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uy ou are instructed that if you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
violated either one or both of the above provisions 
then you are instructed that such violation would 
amount to negligence upon his part and you are 
further instructed that if you find that such viola-
tion was made and that the same was the proximate 
cause of the happening of the incident in question 
and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff then .and 
in that event you would find the issues of negligence 
and proximate cause in her favor and proceed to 
assess such damages as you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence she would be entitled to." 
The part of Instruction No. 10 which defendant con-
tends is erroneous is the last paragraph of the same. Again 
the court has given a formula instruction in which he di-
rects the jury to find that the defendant was negligent if 
it believes that the defendant violated either one or both 
of the statutes, and then directs the jury in that event to 
proceed to assess damages against the defendant. The court 
in that instruction makes no reference to or provision for 
the affect of contributory negligence. 
Instructions Nos. 4 and 10 are inconsistent with In-
structions Nos. 4a and 5 and could result only in confusion 
in the minds of the jurors and I submit that Instruction 
No. 4a and Instruction No. 5 do not correct the errors con-
tained in 4 and 1 0 and do not alleviate the prejudice re-
sulting from those erroneous instructions. 
The errors in the court's instructions are analogous to 
those made by the court as discussed in the case of Mazzotta 
v. Los Angeles CounfJ' and Sant Finkelstein, 153 Pac 2d 
3 3 8 ( c·atiforni3 1944) . In that case the offensive instruc-
tions read as follows: 
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((If you find from the evidence that the de-
fendant, Sam Finkelstein could have avoided this 
accident by exercising ordinary care in using his 
senses of sight and hearing to discover the presence 
of the Los Angeles Railway bus and in preventing 
his automobile from colliding with the bus, ~hen 
you must find for the plaintiff, Jane Mazzotta, and 
against the defendant, Sam Finkelstein." 
Finding that instruction to be erroneous and prejudi-
cial the court said: 
((The instruction upon which Finkelstein sub-
stantially relies as justifying the action of the trial 
court (in granting a new trial) required the jury, 
under certain stated circumstances, to return aver-
dict for Jane Mazzotta. It, therefore, includes a 
formula and -rnay be justified only if it contains all 
of the elements essential to a recovery (citing cases) 
and the absence of any one of the necessary ele-
ments may not be compensated for or cured by the 
fact that other instructions state the omitted fac-
tors required to sustain the verdict directed." (cit-
ing cases) (emphasis added) . 
The error made by the court in the case at bar is 
also analogous to the situation in Spear vs. Leuenberger, 112 
Pac 2d 43 (Cal. 1941). 
There the offensive instruction appearing on P. SO 
was as follows: 
((I further instruct you that if you find the 
defendant neglected any duty, or duties imposed 
upon him by law, or the duties imposed upon him to 
be generally careful and prudent in the operation of 
his automobile and that the accident could not have 
been avoided by plaintiff even though plaintiff ha.d 
observed all demands of law and good judgment 
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because of the recklessness and carelessness of de-
fendant, then you will find for the plaintiff." 
Referring to the instructions the court said: 
celt is contended that this instruction pur-
ported to state all of the conditions upon which 
liability could be imposed upon the defendants; 
that it did not contain the necessary element that 
the defendants' negligence must have been the 
proximate cause of the accident, and that contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff proxi-
mately contributing to the accident would bar 
recovery. Also, that the phrase (all demands of 
law and good judgment' does not· mean contribu-
tory negligence and could not be taken by the jury 
to have that meaning. We are of the opinion that 
this instruction is subject to the criticism stated. It 
has frequently been held that instructions of this 
kind must correctly set forth all of the conditions 
necessary, that the exclusion of any one necessary 
element constitutes reversible error, and that even 
a correct instruction in another part of the charge 
of a matter omitted from the formula instruction 
does not rectify the error." (Emphasis added) 
Later in the opinion the court further stated at P. 52: 
uw e are of the opinion that the rule to be fol-
lowed herein is that set forth in the quite recent 
case of Ferguson v. Nakahara, Cal. App., 110 P. 
2d 1091, de.cided March 12, 1941, and wherein at 
page 109 6 it is said: (All instructions of the court 
are to be considered and construed as a whole to 
determine whether they contain reversible error. If 
a single instruction omits an essential element of the 
cause, but is a correct declaration of the law so far 
as it goes, and the omitted elemen.t is correctly giv-
en in another instruction, the omission will ordi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
narily be cured thereby. If, however, an essential 
principle of law is stated to the jury materially in-
correct, this Prejudicial error will not ordinarily 
be cured by a correct declaration of the same prin-
ciple in another instruction. The· giving of instruc-
tions which are contradictory in essential elements 
may warrant a reversal of a judgment, for the rea-
son that it is impossible to determine which charge 
controlled the determination of the jury.' Soda 
v. Marriott, 118 Cal. App. 63 5, 5 P. 2d 675; see, 
also, Akers v. Cowan, 26 Cal. App. 2d 694, 80 P. 2d 
143.'' (Emphasis added) 
The facts in the case of Williams v. Portland General 
Electric Co. 247 Pac (2d) 494, (Oregon 1952) are not 
analogous, but the pertinent principle with regard to in-
structions is set forth in that case in the following language 
at P. 499: 
((Misleading and inconsistent instructions are 
frequently deemed ground for new trials or rever-
sals." (citing cases) . 
Later the court said: 
uThe parties to any jury case are entitled to 
have the jury instructed in the law which governs 
the case in plain, clear, simple language. The ob-
jective of the mold, framework and language of the 
instructions should be to enlighten and to acquaint 
the jury with the applicable law. Everything 
which is reasonably capable of confusing or mis-
leading the jury should be avoided. Instructions 
which mislead or confuse are ground for a reversal 
. 1 " or a new trta. 
The Pennsylvania court in the cases of Sears v. Birbeck, 
321 Pa. 375, 383, 184 A. 6 ,10, and in Randolph v. Camp·-
bell, 62 A. 2d 60, uses this language in both cases: 
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ult is a primary duty of the trial judge-a 
duty that must never be ignored-in charging a 
jury to clarify the issues so that the jury may com-
prehend the questions they are to decide. * * * A 
trial judge's charges which are inadequate or not 
clear, or which tend to mislead, are well recognized 
grounds for reversal." (citing cases) . 
Defendant also contends that the court committed 
prejudicial error in failing to give defendant's requested 
instruction which reads as follows: 
((When a pedestrian is located on a roadway 
which is open to the use of the public for purposes 
of vehicular travel the pedestrian has the duty to 
yield the right of way to automobiles traveling on 
such roadway." 
As indicated .earlier in this brief, it is defendant's con-
tention that plaintiff was walking or standing on a portion 
of the public roadway, rather than on a private driveway, 
at the time she was struck and that, therefore, the motor 
vehicle statutes quoted earlier in the brief were applicable 
to her conduct. Reading the court's instructions as a whole 
reveal that the theory upon which defendant relied in this 
respect was never submitted to the jury. The jury had no 
opportunity under the instructions of determining wheth-
er or not the plaintiff was located on a public roadway or 
a private driveway at the time she was struck and accord-
ingly had no opportunity to determine whether or not she 
was negligent per se for violating the state statute. 
It should be noted that in the original pretrial order 
the driveway involved was referred to as a private drive-
way. However, immediately before trial on motion of the 
defendant the word private was stricken from the pre-
trial order. 
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The court's action in refusing to submit that issue to 
the jury was erroneous and prejudicial. 
CONCLUSIO·N 
Based on defendant's ·Contention that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law the defendant 
asks the court to reverse the trial court and order judgment 
for the defendant. In the alternative, defendant, relying 
on the erroneous and prejudicial instructions of the court 
and the court's failureto give the requested instruction de-
scribed, requests the court to set aside the verdict and order 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER, 
MARVIN J. BER TOCH, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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